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Information Asymmetry: Private Knowledge Beats
Collateral in Reducing the Information Wedge
Abstract:
In this first ever study to examine the marginal importance of collateral level vis-à-vis
reputation in reducing information asymmetry, we find using unique data for UK business
credit, that pre-existing reputation is the single-most important determinant in inducing a bank
to extend a loan.  Moreover, a bank responds positively to higher levels of collateral and
negatively to higher credit requests.  Similar to Cole (1998), but controlling for collateral
level, we find that it helps to have banked with the lender before.  Non-trivial information
search costs imply an important role for reputation in extending credits.3
1 Introduction
We set out to look at the issue of information asymmetry from a fresh perspective.
Typically the empirical and theoretical literature views 'reputation models' (Diamond,
1989; Petersen and Rajan, 1995) and 'signalling models' (Bester, 1985; Besanko and
Thakor, 1987; Clemenz, 1993) as being mutually exclusive to one another.  Early
signalling models recognised the ability of collateral to plug any information gap
between borrower and lender.  On the other hand, the reputation models distinguish
between the business-bank relationship that is built up over time (private reputation)
and the creditworthiness of a firm that is conveyed to outsiders as the firm ages
(public reputation).
1
The literature does not provide a clear analysis of the marginal effects of reputation
and collateral on a lender’s decision to extend credit. The shortcoming of using an
indicator variable for collateral in existing literature, is that nowhere in the financial
literature do we have an analysis of the marginal effects of changes in the value of
collateral on reducing the information wedge, while simultaneously controlling for
bank-borrower reputation. 
We set out to close this gap in an analysis of the marginal effect of collateral on the
bank rejection decision, while controlling for bank-borrower reputation.  Our sample
comprises 5,968 credit decisions made for a set of non-listed, UK enterprise Start-ups.
In focusing on UK small businesses to investigate information asymmetries, we
follow in the wake of others who examine the supply-side of UK finance to unlisted
firms by an agent such as a bank (Cressy and Toivanen, 2001) or factor (Wilson and
Summers, 2002).
In our analysis of the marginal effects of these variables on the loan sanctioning
decision, we find that reputation wins out over credit terms (collateral and credit
amount) in shaping a bank’s decision to grant a loan.  This result suggests the
following: insider information (private reputation) is a valuable resource where
                                                
1 This information ‘wedge’ between a lender and borrower, describes the information bias between
what a borrower, vis-à-vis her lender, knows about the viability of an application for credit and the
creditworthiness of the borrower.  See Cressy (2002) for a review of this literature on information
asymmetries4
verifiable outside information is scarce and a bank is significantly more likely to lend
to applicants with a track record.  
Despite reports and theories highlighting the highly competitive market for first time
business loans, which would make first-time loans easier to procure, an applicant with
a bank-borrower history is more likely to secure finance, even when collateral and
loan amounts are controlled for.
Our paper is structured in the following way.  We first give an outline of the theories
of borrower reputation before providing an overview of analyses that have already
been undertaken in this area.  We next describe our econometric model before
discussing our data, in the section that follows.  We provide some summary
descriptives before providing a section outlining the regression results.  In a separate
section we outline the marginal effects for these regressions.  We conclude in a final
section.
2 Theories and analyses of borrower reputation and the information gap
(i)     Borrower assets / wealth / collateral perspective
Models of information asymmetry concentrate on collateral as a signalling, or
alternatively as a risk reduction mechanism.  Signalling involves collateral and one or
two other loan instruments, most usually interest margins.  Borrowers choose from a
menu of paired options, higher risk borrowers signalling their risk status by opting for
low collateral coupled with higher interest margins.  Models that focus on the
signalling function of collateral follow from the early contribution of Bester (1985)
with modifications by Besanko and Thakor (1987) and more recently by Clemenz
(1993).  Signalling models have more recently been downplayed and there is a need
for models that more readily explain why lenders act as they do.
2  Coco (2000)
concludes that 
                                                
2 The motive for a lender to cover against credit exposure appears to be the dominant motive in the
analysis by Manove et. al., (2001).5
‘The [empirical] evidence is incompatible with the use of collateral as a signal of
projects' quality, while broadly consistent with explanations based on its incentive
properties and asymmetric evaluation of projects’.
3
Our own anecdotal experience from conversations with lenders who deal with
unlisted, small firms, describe the ‘menu approach’ that underpins signalling models
as lacking in realism. 
Whatever the reason behind a lender's need to request collateral and the lack of
realism of some models that describe the use of collateral, there is sufficient empirical
evidence to indicate its importance in credit markets with asymmetric information.
Black et al., (1996) in an aggregate analysis, focus on the knock-on effect of changes
in the value of real estate on lending balances.  Evans and Jovanovic (1989), in a
demand-side model, look at the implications of an exogenous shock (individuals
receiving an inheritance) on entry into self-employment.  More recently, Cressy and
Toivanen (2001) conclude that the lack of correlation between collateral and borrower
type (an ex post risk measure), is consistent with a regime of symmetric information.
(ii)  Multi-period models of borrower reputation
The Boot and Thakor (1994) and Diamond (1989) models predict that interest
margins in the second period (after some repayment behaviour has been observed) are
higher than interest margins in the first period i.e. that interest margins fall as bank-
borrower reputation lengthens. 
Boot and Thakor describe a repeated credit market game where all banks initially
charge high interest rates to first-time borrowers.  Once the lender has survived the
first lending period, the lender is in a position to relax the interest margin and charge a
margin that is commensurate with the now reduced risk status of the borrower.
Collateral requirements are also relaxed.  The Diamond model, like the B-T model,
predicts lower interest margins for borrowers in subsequent lending periods.
Diamond assumes a multi-period framework where it pays a borrower to develop a
reputation once she has survived the first period with higher borrowing margins.  
                                                
3 P.191, Coco (2000)6
Other models consider either directly or indirectly the role of reputation in attenuating
borrower risk, with implications for the interest margin (Greenbaum et al., 1989;
Sharpe, 1990).  Sharpe predicts that interest margins rise with the duration of the
business bank relationship because a borrower becomes informationally captured and
cannot exit the borrowing relationship.  Similarly, Greenbaum et al. predict a positive
relationship between relationship and interest margin.  Unlike Sharpe, they attribute
this phenomenon to the presence of exit costs, which a borrower incurs when
changing bank.  
3 Influence of Reputation and Collateral in the Empirical Literature
 
  This section describes the main variables shown in the empirical literature to affect
the decision to grant a loan to a first-period borrower.  We concentrate specifically on
reputation and collateral, which represent the joint objectives of this study.  However,
we include other control variables, hypothesised and shown to affect lending terms.




Cressy and Toivanen (2001) document the role of collateral in credits to unlisted
firms, Avery et al. (1998) to a sample of listed and unlisted firms, while Berger and
Udell (1995) focus on collateral in the context of commitment loans only (overdrafts).
A common denominator in these studies is the use of a collateral indicator variable,
denoting whether collateral is used or not.  No continuous variable is used.  Therefore,
these studies do not set out to describe the marginal effects of the amount of collateral
on an endogenous loan contract variable (amount, availability of credit, interest
margin).  
Cressy and Toivanen find a trade-off between the collateral dummy and interest
margin using standard regression and 2SLS.  This relationship is significant.
However, they do not report loan size as a function of collateral and thus report no7
result for collateral in the loan size estimations.  Berger and Udell similarly report a
trade-off between collateral and margins for the commitment loans in their sample.
4
However, this coefficient is positive for commitment loans secured on the riskiest
type of assets i.e. inventories.  Finally, Avery et al. find that the smallest firms (in
terms of sales and employee numbers) and youngest firms in their data, and hence the
riskiest, display the highest probabilities of collateral usage.
 
  We hypothesise on the basis of the evidence from the studies above using collateral
indicator variables, that increasing the level of collateral for a given amount of
borrowing, increases a borrower’s chances of raising bank finance.
5  
 
  In so doing we assume that the level of collateral influences the response variable in a
similar way to an indicator variable describing the binary yes/no decision to demand
collateral.  We hypothesise the relationship between the amount of finance requested
and the rejection decision to be positive, on the basis that a cautious bank will seek to
limit its exposure to a small business borrower.
Role of Reputation
We now turn to analyses estimating the impact of business-bank relationships in the
literature.  Berger and Udell (1995), Cole (1998) and Harhoff and Körting (1998)
model this variable as exogenous to some component of the credit contract (interest
margins, rejection probability or collateral).  While Berger and Udell and Harhoff and
Körting estimate interest margins (commitment loans only) as endogenous to
relationship, Cole estimates the decision to extend credit as endogenous to business-
bank relationship.  
The Berger-Udell analysis reports a positive coefficient on the relationship variable
and Cole reports that first-time applicants exhibit higher rejection probabilities than
applicants in subsequent periods.  However, the coefficient for overall relationship
                                                
4 While Cressy and Toivanen (2001) found that collateral is independent of risk type, Berger and Udell
(1995) found that riskier entrepreneurs are more likely to be asked to provide collateral. However,
Cressy and Toivanen have criticised the latter study on the basis that the risk measure (gearing) used
was inappropriate and not a valid ex post measure of risk.
5 This hypothesis is predicated on our ability to control for the risk type of a small business application
for finance, given that all applicants in our sample are denoted as being ‘high risk’ by the bank.8
length is insignificant.  Similarly, Harhoff and Körting find that the coefficient on the
relationship duration variable is insignificant.  These two results imply that a presence
of a track-record, however minor, is what matters.  
Consistent with the evidence from Harhoff and Körting (1998) and Cole (1998) that
relationship duration is insignificant but merely the existence of any track-record is
important, we expect that a pre-existing borrowing reputation raises the business
owner’s chances of raising bank finance.  It follows that we expect a positive sign on
our track-record indicator variable.
Other Control Variables
We first turn to the potential influence of variables measuring the quality of an
entrepreneur and/ or an enterprise, on a loan officer’s decision to grant a loan. 
Cressy (1996) and Avery et al. (1998) both use indicator variables to denote business
ownership structure dispersion.  Cressy finds a higher correlation with business
survival and Avery et al. document a higher incidence of collateral use for businesses
with more fragmented ownership.  Accordingly, the ownership dispersion proxy
variable ‘partner’ is included, indicating that an entrepreneur has at least one business
partner.  We also include a business continuity proxy ‘busoper’, on the basis that
businesses where the ownership succession is assured, are favoured by a lender over a
business where business continuity is a problem (Bopaiah, 1997; Cressy, 1996;
Harhoff et al., 1998).
6  A business that is able to continue its day to day operations
even when the main principal is absent through illness or death is denoted by
‘busoper=1’ (See Table 1).  Entrepreneur’s age is also used as a control in several
studies (Cressy, 1996; Avery et al., 1998), and it is therefore included. 
 
  Consistent with Cressy’s argument that an entrepreneur’s age and the survival of her
business are positively related, we include the variable ‘age’ and a squared term to
capture potential non-linear effects.  The duration of a borrower’s work experience is
                                                
6 Anecdotal evidence from conversations with German bankers denoted business continuity/
succession issues as a major concern jeopardizing a long term lending relationship9
conveyed by the variable ‘exp’, with the squared term included as a control for
diminishing returns to experience.  We hypothesise that business cash flow, captured
in our variable ‘liq1’, also informs the bank’s decision on the basis of its high
correlation with business survival (Schellenger and Cross, 1994; Taffler, 1999).  We
expect that the sign of the coefficient of our growth proxy ‘growth1’ shows that
higher growth is associated with a higher rejection likelihood because excessive early
growth drains the enterprise of cash flow, thereby increasing the likelihood that the
entrepreneur will default on her repayments.  Our final business attribute variable
‘norisk’ denoting borrower confidence, has not been used in any study to date.  A
value of 1 for this dummy, indicates that the borrower has stated on her application
form for finance that, in her opinion, the business will not encounter any risks in the
year ahead.  If a loan officer believes her business forecast, then this variable should
be negatively related to the likelihood of rejection.
7
 
  Finally, interest margins were not included as loan contract variables because they are
set after a loan officer has reached its decision to lend to small firm or otherwise i.e.
they arise ex post.
4 Model specifications and methodology
The fundamental question that our analysis aims to answer is; which variables are the
most significant in predicting whether a loan was turned down or not?  Secondly,
what is the marginal contribution of collateral vis-à-vis reputation in reducing the
rejection probability?
We use a logistic regression specification to model the relationship between the ex
post likelihood that the bank rejects a first-period business loan.
8  The model for bank
rejection, ‘con’ is Coni=1 for a rejected borrower (has had application rejected) and
Coni=0 otherwise. For the logistic regression let
Pr (Coni=1) = G(Zi),   = ∀i {1,2},
                                                
7 An alternative outcome is also possible. If a sanctioner believes that more confident entrepreneurs are
higher risk, as de Meza and Southey (1996) have suggested,  the sanctioner may penalize applicants
who state that their business is low risk on the basis that an entrepreneur misrepresents the extent of
commercial risk10
Where PR (Yi=1) denotes the probability of Yi = 1,
and G(Zi) is the corresponding cumulative logistic function defined as 
G(Zi) = 1/(1+e
-Zi)’ ∀ i  = - ∞< Zi < ∞
and
Where 
j = 1 is our relationship proxy
j = 2- 6 are our loan contract variables (including collateral)
j = 7 is our size proxy
j = 8-15 are entrepreneur/business variables
j = 16-18 are credit history variables
as set out in Table 1 and discussed above.
5 Discussion of the data
Our data comprises 5,968 first-period business credit applications to a major UK retail
bank for the period January 1998 until December 1999.
9  Of the 5,968 observations,
approximately 28 percent (1,695 applicants) had their applications for finance turned
down.  Applicants are individuals applying for credit on behalf of their business.
Although all businesses are business start-ups, and hence we are dealing with first-
period business credit applications, this does not preclude applicants from having
established a previous credit history with the bank.
All businesses are either Sole Proprietorships or Partnerships.  Previous reputation is
non-commercial only e.g. a loan applicant setting up a Sole Proprietorship has
borrowed from the bank before in a personal capacity.  Information on corporate
governance can only be gauged by looking at details such as guarantee provision (a
                                                                                                                                           
8 Cole (1998) also uses a logistic regression with a more limited set of explanatory variables
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hallmark of companies with Limited status) and ownership dispersion.
10  However,
we estimate that 2 percent of the sample are Limited Companies, 37 percent are Sole
Proprietorships and the remaining 61 percent are partnerships.  
We cannot, for reasons of confidentiality, disclose the name of the bank that donated
the data used in our analysis.  However, we can perform a check as to whether our
data from this bank is representative of UK loans in general for this period.  We
examine data from the same period (1998) from the Forum of Private Business Survey
(Figure 1).  Applicants cited ‘Other Banks’, as the banking category most likely to
damage their business through rationing.  The ‘Bank of Scotland’ is listed as the bank
least likely to do so.  The χ2 statistic for the inter-bank differential in perceptions is
significant.
Comparisons with other banks from the UK Banks FPB Survey for 1998 show that
the bank that permitted us to use its data, does not adopt an extreme rejection policy.
However, the sample bank does operate a high rejection rate compared to the 15.5
percent rejection rate of firms in Cole’s US National Survey of Small Business
Finances (NSSBF) data.  The reasons for this are as follows.  Firstly, the UK
businesses in our data are on average smaller than firms in the US data and may
therefore be higher risk.  Their average sales amount to £281,267 (standard deviation
of £1,656,031) compared to a sales turnover of approximately £4,485,507
($6,190,000) for US firms. 
Secondly, all businesses in our data are new commercial borrowers and designated as
‘high risk’ by the bank, whereas this constraint did not apply in the US data.  Since a
bank is likely to be more cautious about granting loans to new commercial borrowers,
it follows that the higher rejection rate in our data is likely to be a consequence of the
relatively higher risk of lending to applicants in our data.
                                                
10 This data was originally used to construct a proprietary scorecard.  Corporate Governance details
were not included.12
Finally, there is the possibility that businesses in our sample applied for credit with
more than one bank and hence the overall rejection rate in the population of
applicants for credit is likely to be lower.
11
6 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 outlines the univariate statistics for the relationship, loan contract, size,
firm/entrepreneur specific and credit history variables used in our analysis. 
[Table 2 here]
Column 2 describes the mean value for the group that was denied credit by the bank
in each case.  Alternatively, in the case of indicator variables, Column 2 indicates the
proportion of firms within the category of the variable that was denied credit.  These
individual proportions for separate indicator variables can then be compared to the
overall rejection rate of 28.4 percent.  Column 3 likewise describes the mean amounts
or proportions for each of the separate explanatory variables that will later be used in
our estimations.  In this instance, the proportions are compared to the overall
acceptance rate of 71.6 percent.  Column 4 contains the significance levels and test
statistics for each of the variables in the table.
We can see from Table 2 that the most significant variables are the relationship and
the loan contract variables.  However, some of the firm/entrepreneur characteristics
are also significantly associated with the sanctioning of finance.
Of the significant variables, if a borrower has borrowed finance previously from the
bank for her own personal use (‘prevbor’=1), it raises the probability that she will
receive funding for her business.  The proportion of accepted applicants within the
category of borrowers with existing borrowings is 81 percent, compared with an
overall acceptance rate of 71.6 percent.
                                                
11 See Storey (1999) for an excellent analysis of this phenomenon13
Firms that are extended credit are more likely to request smaller amounts.  The
difference in the means of £9,682 is significant at the 0.01 level.  Firms who are
successful with their loan applications are also more likely to provide higher
collateral. The difference of £6,293 in the value of collateral is also significant at the
0.01 level. We can conclude therefore that a sanctioner is more likely to accept credit
applicants where the bank’s exposure to the possibility of default is minimised i.e. the
credit amount is comparatively low and the collateral level is comparatively high. 
Consistent with the cautious approach employed by the bank that we have seen in its
preference for low risk loans, is the slight but significant preference for non-working
capital loans, which is significant at the 0.10 level.
Turning to the firm/entrepreneur characteristics that significantly affect the decision
to deny credit; the self-assessment by the entrepreneur of her own risk is highly
significant.  More sanguine entrepreneurs who see no risks that would jeopardise their
business projects, are more likely to receive credit than entrepreneurs who cite
business risk as a potential problem are.  Finally, the bank shows a marked preference
for businesses who can operate in the absence of the principal owner, as evidenced by
the higher proportion (73 percent) of applicants in this group who receive finance.
There is only one variable, namely credit history, in the last group and this is
significantly related to the credit granting decision.  Firms whose applicants for
finance have demonstrated financial difficulty in the past, ‘fin_dif’=1, are
significantly less likely to receive credit than firms who have an unsullied credit
history.
Overall, the univariate statistics point to the fact that the bank is cautious about the
extent of its exposure to the risk of the business.  However, it responds positively to a
business who is in a position to finance a portion of the project, who is confident of
the outcome of her project and who can assure the bank that the business can continue
to manage its daily operations in the owner’s absence. 14
7 Regression results
We now move on to the first regression that estimates the relationship between the
four main categories of explanatory variables and the probability that an entrepreneur
has her credit application turned down.  In other words, we model the likelihood that
‘con=1’.  The results are shown in Table 3.
[Table 3 here]
Column 1 describes the model when we include the business-bank relationship
variable, ‘prevbor’, on its own.  Consistent with what we have already seen in the
univariate statistics, ‘prevbor’ is highly statistically significant and has a negative
sign.  This indicates that the bank is significantly less likely to reject application from
entrepreneurs who have borrowed from the bank on a previous occasion.  This result
underpins the importance of insider information in attenuating credit risk.  It also
corroborates Cole’s (1998) findings regarding the importance of insider information.
The  pseudo r-squared value of 0.009 is low.  Nevertheless, as the χ
2 statistic
indicates, the overall model is statistically significant. 
Column 2 indicates the regression model of the accept/reject decision after the loan
contract variables are added.  Once again, consistent with what we have already seen
in the univariate statistics, the higher the value of collateral provided, the lower the
probability that an applicant will have her application for finance rejected, as
indicated by a negatively signed coefficient.  This confirms evidence from Basu and
Parker (2001) that entrepreneurs attribute the lack of sufficient security as the main
reason for having an application for finance rejected.  However, there appear to be
diminishing returns to collateral provision, as suggested by the positive sign on the
coefficient of the variable ‘coll2’.
The larger the amount requested by the borrower, the higher the probability that a
borrower’s application will be declined by the bank, as evidenced in the positive sign15
and high significance of the coefficient of the variable ‘borr’.  Corroborating what we
have seen earlier in the univariate statistics, loans for working capital purposes are
more likely to be turned down.
In  Column 3, we include the size control variable ‘projsal’ but this is neither
significant nor does it affect the model fit.  The results in Column 4 describe the
effect on the regression outcome when the entrepreneur/firm specific variables are
added to the model.  The pseudo r
2 increases to 0.024. 
Consistent with our conjecture as to the effect of assured business succession on the
sanctioning decision, the negative coefficient of the variable ‘busoper’ indicates that
businesses with no succession issues, are less likely to have their loans turned down.
Business borrowers who have reinvested capital in their business or who have
partially financed their projects using their own funds, are also less likely to have
their loan requests turned down.  Also entrepreneurs who are confident that their
businesses face no risks, are more likely to be successful. 
Finally in Column 5 we include the credit history variable ‘fin_dif’ indicating
whether the business owner exhibited insolvency in the past or had her borrowings
rescheduled.  The pseudo r
2 increases to 0.026.  As we would expect, applicants who
have experienced financial difficulty in the past are significantly less likely to be
granted a loan.
8 Individual variables explaining the bank accept/reject decision
When interpreting the value of the coefficients in a logistic regression, we refer to the
odds ratios because these reflect the most accurate measure of the individual
contribution of the variables although the standardised coefficients can be used for
ranking the variables in order of their relative importance (Allison, 1999).  Table 4
describes the marginal effects of the individual explanatory variables on the
sanctioner’s decision.
[Table 4 here]16
Column 1 in Table 4 recalls the beta values for the full regression model described in
the previous table.  In Column 2, the odds ratio for each of the explanatory variables
is calculated.  The odds ratio i.e. the probability of being rejected divided by the
probability of being accepted, (PREJECT / (1 – PREJECT)), is calculated by obtaining the
exponent of the beta values.  In order to derive the values in Column 3, we first of all
calculate the base odds ratio from the regression coefficients in order to provide a
baseline against which we can measure any marginal effects.  This baseline value
(base odds ratio) is calculated by substituting back the averages of the continuous
variables and setting the dummy variables equal to zero.  The exponential of the
resulting value is the base odds ratio, which is found to be equal to 0.4877.  This in
turn is multiplied by the odds ratio for each variable in turn to obtain the change in the
probability of being turned down when the dummy variables are equal to 1 or when
the continuous variables increase/decrease by £100,000.
In Column 4 we convert the modified base odds ratio, where the marginal effect is
included, to a rejection probability, PREJECT, for that variable.  Finally, in Column 5,
the change in rejection probabilities from the baseline probability of approximately 33
percent, is calculated as PREJECT – PBASE, in order to demonstrate how entrepreneurs
possessing this attribute exhibit rejection probabilities that differ from the baseline
rejection probability.
We see in Table 4 that the relationship dummy, ‘prevbor’, is the single most
important variable in the regression, where new applicants for corporate finance are
12 percent less likely to have their applications turned down if they have banked with
the lender before in a non-commercial capacity.  In comparison, the probability of
being turned down if collateral increases by £100,000 decreases by 3.98%.  Put
another way, having previously borrowed has the same effect on the chance of being
turned down as having an additional £32,096 of collateral.  This result confirms the
importance of previous borrowing relationships testified by Cole (1998).
12  It also
                                                
12 However, Cole (1998) did not include a marginal analysis of the effect of pre-existing borrowing
relationships on the sanctioning decision and hence he did not quantify the impact of pre-existing
relationships on the sanctioning process in terms of the percentage change in the rejection likelihood.17
confirms our view that with asymmetric information, private knowledge is highly
effective compared with collateral in attenuating risk by a lender.
Applicants retaining a profit or ploughing their own equity into a business project
(‘liq1’=1), are almost 8 percent less likely to be rejected compared with the baseline
probability level.  Hence the bank values the self-financing capability of new
commercial borrowers.
Commercial borrowers who have had previous borrowings rescheduled due to an
inability to meet repayments or who have been insolvent in the past, (‘fin_dif’=1), are
5.8 percent less likely to have their applications accepted. 
The role of entrepreneurial self-confidence is evident in the fact that applicants who
state on their application forms that they do not foresee any risks lie ahead that would
threaten their project (‘norisk’=1), are 4.3 percent more likely to obtain finance.  De
Meza and Southey (1996) have documented some of the theoretical considerations
relating to entrepreneurial self-confidence and have concluded that the most risky
entrepreneurs are likely to be more confident.  We cannot infer from our result
whether these entrepreneurs are higher risk but we can conclude that more confident
entrepreneurs are more likely to have their applications accepted.
A slightly worrying outcome is that applicants applying for working capital finance,
‘working’, are 3.6 percent more likely to be rejected than applicants whose borrowing
purpose is for asset backed finance, even when collateral has been controlled for.  The
problem with this outcome is that liquidity constrained borrowers with good growth
prospects, may find that this constraint bites.
13  However, one could argue that this
marginal effect is small enough to be negligible and what really matters is
relationship, clean track record and an ability to be self-financing. 
It is evident that a bank is cognisant of business continuity issues when sanctioning a
loan to a new commercial borrower.  Business owners who indicate that their business
                                                
13 Actual growth has virtually no effect on the rejection probability18
can continue to operate in their absence, ‘busoper’=1, are associated with lower
rejection probabilities.
14
The loan contract variables ‘coll’ and ‘borr’ do not individually lead to a dramatic
change in the likelihood that a loan is accepted/rejected.  As mentioned, borrowers
providing £100,000 additional collateral, are approximately 4 percent less likely to be
rejected compared with the baseline acceptance probability.  Applicants who request
£100,000 more in bank funding are associated with a relatively higher rejection
probability i.e. a 2.9 percent differential.
9 Conclusions 
It is evident from our estimations that relationship, loan contract and some
entrepreneur/firm variables are important inputs in the sanctioner’s decision to reject a
loan to a new commercial borrower.  Increasing the amount of collateral provided and
reducing the amount of finance requested, increases the likelihood that a loan is
granted.  This indicates that the bank prefers lower risk exposures to higher risk
exposure, all things equal. This outcome is consistent with our expectation that a bank
is a rational, risk adverse agent. 
We conclude that a bank emphasises the value of pre-existing relationships, borrower
credit history and the ability of a borrower to be self-financing when granting a loan.
However, the fact that a borrower has banked with the lender before, is by far the
most important factor enabling a business to elicit a positive lending decision. 
In our analysis of the marginal effects of these variables on the loan sanctioning
decision, we find that reputation wins out over credit terms (collateral and credit
amount) in shaping a bank’s decision to grant a loan.  This result suggests the
following: insider information (private reputation) is a valuable resource where
                                                
14 It appears contradictory that the variable ‘partner’, indicating that the business ownership comprises
at least one owner, is associated with a higher rejection likelihood. The business continuity variable
‘busoper’ has the expected negative sign and ‘partner’ was similarly expected to reduce the rejection
probability. Our explanation for this anomaly is that a sanctioner may be marginally inclined to favour
loans over which it has greater control and increasing the number of partners may decrease the strength
of the relationship between the applicant and his contact at the bank.19
verifiable outside information is scarce, and a bank is significantly more likely to lend
to applicants with a track record.20
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Others Clydesdale Nat west RBS Lloyds Barclays Midland Bank of
Scotland










Chi-Square Tests for Credit Availability Evaluations by Bank
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson χ
2 46.46 28 0.02
Number of Valid Cases 455623
Table 1    List of variables
Response variable Description Predicted sign
con=1 The loan is rejected by the bank  .
Relationship 
prevbor prevbor =1 if applicant has previously borrowed from the bank  (-)
Loan contract 
coll Sum of owner's equity injected into the project in addition to the ‘carcass’ or liquidation
value of land, buildings and life policies offered as collateral
(-)
coll2 Collateral squared
borr Amount of new borrowing requested. Sum of loan, overdraft and any other amounts requested  (+)
borr2 Borrowing squared
working Borrowing used to finance working capital. Most risky type of borrowing as no purchased asset
to submit as collateral against borrowed amount
(+) 
Size variable
projsal Projected sales for the current year (size proxy)
Entrepreneur/business
partner The business owner has at least one business partner i.e. the ownership structure is
dispersed
(-)
busoper The business can continue to exist without the founder. Measure of dispersion of ownership
(busoper=1 if 'Yes')
(-) as for ‘partner’
liq1 Proxy for the ability of the entrepreneur to be self-financing.  Liq1=1 if the business has
reinvested profit in business or injected its own cash into the business project
(-)
growth1 Sales growth. Percentage change in sales from last year’s sales (+) See liq1
age Borrower's age  (+) 
age2 Borrower’s age squared
exp Experience of borrower in current industrial sector
exp2 Experience of borrower in current industrial sector  squared
norisk Borrower believes that he will have no business or financial risks in the year ahead. Denotes
borrower confidence (norisk=1 if 'Yes')
(-) 
Credit history
fin_dif Borrower has had to have her loan rescheduled due to difficulties meeting repayments or has
previously been declared insolvent. Denotes financial distress if debtres=1.
(+) 21
















Number of firms 1,695 4,273
Proportion of firms 28.4% 71.6%
Business-bank relationship





Amount borrowed 76,679 66,997 -3.166
b***
Amount of collateral 52,549 58,842 1.744
b***





Sales 265,250 309,506 0.296
b
Firm/entrepreneur characteristics
Entrepreneur’s age 43.3 43.5 0.582
b
Number of yrs. work experience 12.7 12.5 -0.821
b
Business owner has business partner 29% 71% 1.055
a








Ability to self-finance (has retained









Financial difficulty (fin_dif=1) 33% 67% 15.572
a***
a denotes χ2 statistic (difference in proportions)
b denotes t-test (difference in means)
*** difference in means of groups or proportions significant at the 0.01 level
** difference in means of groups or proportions significant at the 0.05 level
* difference in means of groups or proportions significant at the 0.10 levelC:\Aoife\Papers\constraints3001\JBFA paper0403.doc
Table 3     Logit to determine relative importance of variable groups in    
            accept/reject decision
Response variable: P(con)=1: applic. Rejected (Prob. > χ2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept -.8137*** -.9064*** -.9064*** -1.0098** -.9444***
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0261) (.0378)
Business-bank
relationship
prevbor -.6526*** -.6214*** -.6214*** -.6665*** -.6430***
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
Loan contract terms
coll -1.8E-06*** -1.8E-06*** -1.7E-06*** -1.9E-06***
(.0001) (.0001) (.0003) (.0001)
coll2 9.48E-13** 9.48E-13** 8.83E-13* 9.87E-13**
(0.0412) (.0413) (.0581) (.0344)
borr 1.28E-06** 1.28E-06** 1.48E-06** 1.30E-06**
(.0321) (.0321) (.0129) (.0307)
borr2 4.58E-13 4.58E-13 1.05E-13 3.14E-13
(.6075) (.6076) (.9042) (.7202)
working .1359** .1359** .1672*** .1594***
(.0239) (.0239) (.0062) (.0092)
Size 


























Intercept  7052.50 7021.63 7021.63 6953.49 6941.81
χ2 for covariates 69.766 100.64 100.642 168.776 180.464
DF χ2 for covariates 1 6 7 16 17
Sig. for covariates .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
Pseudo-r
2 0.00989 0.0143 0.0143 0.024 0.026
Number of observations 5,968 5,968 5,968 5,968 5,968
***sig. at 0.01 level           ** sig at 0.05 level           *sig. at 0.10 levelC:\Aoife\Papers\constraints3001\JBFA paper0403.doc
Table 4 Marginal analysis; effect of individual variables on the bank rejection rate
B Odds ratio
(exp(βi))







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept -0.9444
prevbor -0.6430 0.5257 0.2564 0.2041 -12.4%
coll (00,000) -0.1900 0.8270 0.4033 0.2874 -3.98%
borr (00,000) 0.1300 1.1388 0.5553 0.3571 +2.9%
working 0.1594 1.1728 0.5719 0.3638 +3.6%
projsal (00,000) 2.47E-5 1.0000 0.4877 0.3278 0.0%
partner 0.0818 1.0852 0.5292 0.3461 +1.8%
age 0.0254 1.0257 0.5002 0.3334 +0.6%
age2 -0.0003 0.9997 0.4875 0.3277 0.0%
exp -0.0019 0.9981 0.4867 0.3274 0.0%
exp2 0.0001 1.0001 0.4877 0.3278 0.0%
busoper -0.1577 0.8541 0.4165 0.2940 -3.4%
norisk -0.2019 0.8172 0.3985 0.2849 -4.3%
liq1 -0.3845 0.6808 0.3320 0.2492 -7.9%
growth1 0.0001 1.0001 0.4877 0.3278 0.0%
fin_dif 0.2523 1.2870 0.6276 0.3856 +5.8%
1 The base odds ratio = exp(β’i µi  ) = 0.4877 where is the column vector of the mean values of the
continuous variables and of dummy variables ascribed the value of zero
2 PREJECT = base odds ratio * odds ratioi / [1 + (base odds ratio * odds ratioi)] where i = variable i
3 PBASE = base odds ratio/ (1 + base odds ratio) = 0.3272 or 32.7%
Difference in reject rates = PREJECT – PBASE